The final quarter: the decisions that will shape global tech policy

UK: Winter is coming for the King in the North

Britain’s new Prime Minister Andy Burnham returns from the summer break with a full inbox. Three months into office, the next three will set the tone for what is to come.

Parliament comes back first. Burnham steps to the despatch box for his inaugural Prime Minister’s Questions against Conservative leader Kemi Badenoch, and both leaders arrive with something to prove. Badenoch has spent the summer insisting the center-right Conservatives are a changed party, rebuilt after a crushing election defeat. She is also getting her Shadow Cabinet election-ready with a full reshuffle of her top team. Meanwhile, Burnham needs to project command rather than mere occupation of the office. Reform UK, the populist movement that spent an embarrassing stretch of August arguing publicly with a wheelie bin, arrives at its September conference hoping the country has a short memory.

Conference season is where the real substance begins. Burnham has already established “Number 10 North” in Manchester and made devolution the organizing idea of his premiership: power out of Westminster, into the regions. An idea needs architecture, and conference is where the blueprint starts to emerge. A 10-year plan follows in November, covering utilities, infrastructure, and a series of major policy documents. That is when the Government’s longer strategy comes fully into view.

The 28 October Budget is the biggest test of the autumn. The numbers are tight: borrowing overshot forecasts in July despite record tax receipts, while inflation is at 2.9% and climbing on the back of the Iran war’s squeeze on energy. Public sector pay deals above 3%, new social care funding, and a borrowing surge are all off the table. Burnham has declined to rule out tax rises, telling reporters he “won’t be unrealistic.” Capital gains tax is the name being whispered loudest. Something has to give — and October is when we find out what.

For tech, the red signals are already flashing. Burnham’s advisors are rewriting the UK’s AI strategy, moving away from what they describe internally as a “US-focused approach” and toward technology sovereignty and domestic industrial priorities. The message from Number 10 is pointed: “unfettered tech boosterism is a vote-loser.” The NHS’s £330 million contract with data analytics company Palantir is under active review, with a break-clause decision needed by December. The G20, expected in Manchester, puts global AI governance alongside the conflicts in Ukraine and Iran at the top of the international agenda. The UK’s direction on AI regulation and public procurement will crystallize this autumn. Companies not in the room, adjusting to the new government’s priorities, will find the decisions already made.

EU: Von der Leyen’s State of the Union: caught in French election politics?

On 16 September, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen takes the floor of the European Parliament for her annual State of the Union address — the traditional milestone of the Brussels rentrée. The timing could hardly be more charged: war on the continent, rising geopolitical tensions, and a French presidential election looming large — one that could alter the EU’s political center of gravity. What she says, and what she carefully avoids, will matter.

Von der Leyen is likely to use the address to scan a crowded autumn agenda, positioning herself ahead of key moments in the weeks to come — from the budgetary negotiations to the expected publication of a proposal to strengthen Frontex.

The Commission President is speaking to two audiences: EU institutions and national governments. The next 18 months bring a French presidential election and general elections in Italy and Poland, all against a backdrop of rising populism. As the EU mainstream’s leading voice, she is acutely aware of what a populist government in Paris would mean for EU cohesion. Expect the speech to appeal directly to centrist leaders in Paris, Rome, and Warsaw.

On digital policy, she is expected to call for deeper investment in technological sovereignty — AI, cloud, quantum computing, semiconductors, and space — with strong backing from Paris and Berlin. The Commission’s ambition is a more assertive digital industrial policy: greater public financing and tighter EU procurement rules. This is partly a performative narrative: Europe casting itself as a digital power, not just a digital regulator, in response to anxiety about US and Chinese competition.

The central legislative vehicle for the tech sovereignty agenda is the Cloud and AI Development Act (CADA), which could soon find itself caught in French election politics. France is likely to pressure the Irish and Lithuanian presidencies to lock in a Council position before the March elections. A deal secured after a populist victory in France could look different. A Le Pen win for Rassemblement National could preserve some continuity on tech sovereignty, since she would seek to reassure on economic policy. A Mélenchon win for La France Insoumise would be seismic, hardening French positions on digital policy towards further EU-US tech decoupling.

The speech may not yet be ready — but it is already being written with one eye on Paris.

US: All roads lead to November

Congress returns from its August recess with barely sixty days until the 3 November midterms. The House resumes votes on 1 September and the Senate on 14 September; both plan to leave Washington again by 2 October. For those few weeks, any official business will be aimed at the ballot box.

The spending cliff is up first. Government funding expires on 1 October, and FY2027 appropriations remain in the balance. The Senate has passed a continuing resolution through 11 December, leaving the House to accept it or force another round of brinkmanship. Yet another stopgap is likely, moving the real spending fight into December.

The electorate cares most about affordability. That means a continued policy focus on interest rates, energy prices, and tariffs as we enter the fall. Key questions: will Americans care about President Xi’s expected September visit, with AI and trade on the agenda? Will the data center backlash turn AI infrastructure development into a political fight over electricity bills, water, and tax incentives?

Forecasters expect Democrats to take the House, with the Senate a coin flip. Both are a referendum on the Trump presidency two years in (current polls, for what they’re worth, find the President to be deeply underwater). Should the House  flip, Republicans may attempt a final legislative push before January. After that, a Democrat-controlled House would prioritize subpoena-backed oversight and ensure legislative gridlock through the back half of Trump’s term.

If Democrats take the House, expect more hearings, subpoenas, and appropriations fights in 2027 and beyond. Meanwhile, President Trump will likely double down on executive action, with the volume turned up on political discord. Companies will need to avoid getting caught in the middle.

Latin America: The regulatory season the region can no longer postpone

In Latin America, the return from the southern hemisphere’s winter break coincides with what is shaping up to be the most consequential stretch for technology policy the region has seen.

Brazil is consolidating its position as the continent’s regulatory anchor. Bill 2338, the country’s comprehensive, risk-based AI framework, has cleared the Chamber of Deputies and awaits staged implementation from late 2026. The data protection authority is executing an ambitious 2025–2027 agenda, including a pilot AI regulatory sandbox running through December 2026, while the new Digital Statute adds age verification for loot-box games and transparency obligations for generative AI providers. Brasília is not waiting for a single AI Act; it is building a layered regulatory architecture across data protection, child safety, and AI governance simultaneously.

Brazil’s external positioning is equally deliberate. In June 2026, the EU and Brazil formalized a Digital Partnership, making Brazil a priority digital partner for Brussels alongside Canada, Japan, and Singapore. The agreement covers AI governance, data sovereignty, cloud infrastructure, and online platform regulation. The geopolitical subtext is unmistakable: both sides are hedging against technological dependence on the United States and China, and Brazil is positioning itself as the bridge between European regulatory ambition and Latin American market scale. For companies operating across the Atlantic, the convergence of Brazilian and EU standards is a material compliance development.

Argentina offers the starkest ideological contrast. President Milei has promised tech firms “unregulated AI” and is courting hyperscale data center investment with tax exemptions, preferential foreign-exchange conditions, and energy deals targeting Patagonia’s cool climate and cheap power. The flagship Stargate Argentina project, a USD 20–25 billion data center complex, would be the first of its kind in Latin America. Milei has also proposed legislation to create “non-human corporations” run entirely by AI agents. The ambition is to make Argentina the region’s AI hub through radical deregulation and infrastructure incentives. The execution, however, is lagging considerably. The Stargate project has not advanced, and the non-human corporation bill faces congressional resistance over accountability and liability gaps. Argentina’s bet is attract first, regulate later, but the gap between announcement and delivery is widening.

Across the rest of the region, the direction is unmistakable even if the pace varies. Colombia has deepened digital infrastructure cooperation with China through a January 2026 agreement on 5G, fiber optics, and satellite connectivity. Chile has updated its National AI Policy and introduced a risk-based AI bill. Mexico’s Congress is pushing amendments to labor and copyright laws targeting image rights and AI-generated content. The common thread is that existing legal frameworks — privacy, consumer protection, labor, IP — are being stretched to cover AI even where comprehensive AI legislation remains pending. Companies operating across multiple LATAM jurisdictions face a fragmented but accelerating regulatory landscape where the compliance baseline is shifting faster than many realize. And the best is yet to come.

Middle East: Sovereignty and the like

Arguably, 2026 has been the most consequential year for governments across the Middle East and North Africa, and particularly for member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council — noting the continued conflict in the region.

As we return to school on 1 September, sovereignty will remain the key buzzword, albeit with enhanced nuance and an understanding that the conversation has evolved beyond server and data center locations towards demonstrable control over data, infrastructure, and model safety. Governments across the region will continue to invest heavily in ensuring telecommunications resilience and minimizing interruption to their digital-first programs across the social and economic spheres.

Beyond sovereignty, public sector spending will decrease or, in a best-case scenario, flatten throughout Q4. Consequently, technology companies, local and foreign alike, will need to get creative in how they conclude partnerships with government counterparts to accelerate their go-to-market journeys. We are firmly into the “pay-to-play” era.

Regulatory convergence will not improve, given the fundamental differences in positions and alliances being formed across the Gulf and, to an extent, the rest of the region. If anything, the pace of regulatory change and development will accelerate, as governments attempt to regulate the use of artificial intelligence, payments, e-learning, and health-enabled verticals.

Brace for two scenarios: relative calm with the regional conflict dying out or slowing as it did through most of Q3, or more uncertainty as the world anticipates what the White House will do next. Either way, look out for local champions (individuals and enterprises alike). These are now the Middle East’s fastest-growing line item, and arguably the biggest regional bet since 2016 saw the launch of several long-term national visions.

Southeast Asia: Playing the room

Southeast Asia has become an increasingly political place to do business — and the jostling between formal neutrality and pragmatic positioning will only continue to grow in Q4.

The diplomatic calendar sets the stage. The 49th ASEAN Summit convenes 10–12 November in the Philippines, arguably the most US-leaning of the eleven members, followed a week later by APEC in Shenzhen, where China hosts under a banner of openness, innovation and cooperation. The back-to-back summits capture the dilemma: ASEAN governments want the upside of AI, advanced manufacturing and resilient supply chains without having to choose sides in the Washington–Beijing rivalry. ASEAN will struggle, as always, to turn familiar language on unity and centrality into something operational, while both superpowers press sustained soft-power plays.

Energy security dominates the policy agenda. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz took roughly a fifth of global crude and gas flows offline, ending Southeast Asia’s long debate about supply diversification. The energy shock has made Russia and non-Gulf suppliers the immediate winners, expanded the U.S. commercial foothold through trade-linked energy contracts, and reinforced China’s longer-term leverage in solar, batteries and grids. The net result is more diversified dependence, not — at least not yet — a decisive strategic gain for either Washington or Beijing.

On trade, the legal architecture around US tariffs has been in constant motion since the Supreme Court struck down IEEPA authority in February. Section 122 followed, expired on 24 July, and was replaced by Section 301, this time on forced-labor grounds. Cambodia, Indonesia, and Malaysia face an additional 10% tariff; the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam face 12.5%. The bigger uncertainty is ahead: the US Trade Representative is investigating alleged excess industrial capacity across 16 economies, six of them ASEAN members. With no rate ceiling and no automatic expiry, Section 301 is the region’s single biggest trade variable for Q4 and early 2027. US pressure to fold defence and security into bilateral trade talks adds new challenges to ASEAN’s stance of formal neutrality.

On technology, competing AI governance frameworks — in particular the US-backed Pax Silica and the China-initiated World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization (WAICO) — are creating new stresses in ASEAN capitals. Pax Silica began as a US-led trusted supply-chain coalition spanning critical minerals, semiconductors, advanced manufacturing, energy, and AI infrastructure. Singapore was a founding signatory while the Philippines joined in April 2026. WAICO, launched in Shanghai in July, offers the Global South training, application centers, open-source capabilities and a voice in global rule-setting. Five ASEAN members—Indonesia, Malaysia, Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar—became founding members. Thailand and Vietnam have yet to join either. ASEAN still treats optionality as its highest-value asset, and will look to home-grown initiatives to set a regional baseline before the competing frameworks fragment it.

Organizations that can read where these decisions are moving, before they are announced, will be the ones ready when they land.