

Ethan Mudavanhu
Data Governance
In Africa, core services such as communications, electric grids, transport systems, health services, and smart cities, are increasingly dependent on cloud services. With an estimated 500 million Internet users, Africa has one the fastest growing telephone and Internet networks in the world.[1] It has resulted in an equally rapid expansion of cyber-crimes and the need to integrate cybersecurity into business strategy and policy considerations.
This also makes the region a priority hotspot for the expansion of foreign platforms looking to expand their user bases. The new African Continental Free Trade Agreement is set to create the largest free trade area in terms of the number of member nations – 54;[2] connecting over 1.3 billion individuals, with a total gross domestic product (GDP) of USD 3.4 trillion;[3] and possess a predicted total personal and commercial expenditure of USD 6.7 trillion.[4]
Therefore, the increase in internet networks, together with the increase in free trade movement simultaneously positions the continent for accelerated growth over coming years and renders African cyberspace governance a core issue of international foreign policy and international law. As the authors further discuss below, and for purposes of the focus of this article, it invites China’s “Zou Chuqu” (going out) strategy – which consists of cultural and educational diplomacy.
The past decade has seen a dramatic increase in Africa’s internet penetration, mostly facilitated through the expansion of mobile phone infrastructure.[5] This rise in connectivity has marked Africa as an emerging market for all manner of ICT role players, including social media companies, cloud service providers, telecoms companies and hardware providers.
Prioritizing the continued development and deployment of ICT infrastructure is a clear priority for the continent. Among the several development initiatives, the African Union’s Agenda 2063 reflects this as a collective regional effort.[6] It is the continent’s common strategy structure for inclusive growth and sustainable development, which was developed independently by African countries. Its underlying thinking and specific planning are reflected in the Agenda 2063 Framework Document and its First Ten- Year Implementation Plan, which emphasize a guiding vision to build an integrated, world class communications and connectivity infrastructure – “driven and managed by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the international arena.”[7]
At a national level, African countries have steadily been moving towards adopting dedicated cybercrime laws, most recently South Africa with the Cybercrimes Act of 2020, Ghana Cybersecurity Act of 2020 and Lesotho having recently approved the Cybercrime Bill.[8] However, the total number of African countries with a robust cybersecurity framework remains low. The ITU Global Cybersecurity Index assessed 54 African countries and found that 19 countries had active Computer Emergency Response Teams and 29 had legal frameworks for cybersecurity.[9]
While these statistics paint the picture of a continent not ready for the myriad of threats posed by rising cybercrimes, the African Union itself has taken steps towards addressing these risks. In 2019, the African Union Cybersecurity Expert Group held its inaugural meeting.[10] The group seeks to, amongst other things, address:
As Internet penetration rises and systems become more connected, critical infrastructure across Africa will likely become even more vulnerable to costly, disruptive cyberattacks. The threat is two-fold. First, there is the direct threat of cyber-attack which will affect entity’s own data integrity and business functions. Second, there is the indirect threat arising from the disruption of logistics chains. As the recently published INTERPOL’s African Cyberthreat Assessment Report 2021 exposed:
There has never been a more crucial time to chart a way forward and ensure that efforts are focused on improving security and safety in cyberspace for all African countries. In recognition of this, China’s foreign policy strategy in Africa is geared towards establishing itself as the region’s ICT partner.
China’s Zou Chuqu strategy in Africa is often either applied bilaterally or through the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). Since the setup of the FOCAC in 2000, cooperation for security has become an important theme of Sino-African cooperation. The forum’s goals include the socialization of political collaboration in development and governance, as well as fostering a favorable climate for Sino-African commerce and trade. China has also set out funds to help well-established Chinese businesses engage in Africa.[11]
With China’s growing interest in Africa and the strengthening of the Sino-African partnership, more African governments are inviting China to assist them with their security challenges. Moreover, in the recent introduction of China’s International Strategy of Cooperation on Cyberspace (ISCC),[12] the fields of cooperation have expanded to include online security. Consequently, Sino-African cybersecurity cooperation has emerged as a key component of China’s new strategic alliance with Africa.
This has had a significant impact on Africa’s political, economic, and societal affairs. The ISCC is China’s first international strategy focusing on cyber issues. In the African context, it is thus a strategic document of significance that is guiding Sino-African cooperation on cyberspace governance. As the article highlights, Africa is still in its infancy stage in terms of cybersecurity development – from both an infrastructural and regulatory standing. Viewed from the perspective of the continent’s rapidly growing number of Internet users, the current security governance structure creates a plethora of multitiered opportunities and challenges for both private sector and government alike, including:
To this end, the ISCC examines cyberspace prospects and problems, and proposes six strategic goals that are relevant to African concerns, including: safeguarding sovereignty and security, developing a system of international rules, promoting fair internet governance, protecting legitimate rights and interests of citizens, promoting cooperation on digital economy, and building platforms for cyber culture exchange.
The question has been raised as to whether China seeks to export a distinct Chinese development model that can be copied in other nations, specifically those in Africa, as part of its efforts to fulfill these foreign policy goals. Many argue that this should be examined especially in connection to the African politicians who are often invited to China and courted by Chinese diplomats and corporations.[13] Nonetheless, what is apparent and measurable is Chinese ascendency in Africa’s digital economy market in the lines of governance, cloud service provision and communications.
Chinese companies have been investing heavily into Africa, with tech giant Huawei spearheading most of the initiatives by China on the continent. Huawei has directly contributed to the building of ICT infrastructure in many African countries, such that it has developed 50% of Africa’s 3G networks and 70% of the continents 4G networks, making it a dominant player in the sector.[14] These developments are often funded by the Export-Import Bank of China, including:
These investments are a direct development plan under the Digital Silk Road initiative, which itself is part Belt and Road Initiative (“BRI”). The Digital Silk Road seeks to connect BRI priority countries through cross border optical cables and communications networks. China has identified 39 African countries as part of its BRI initiative.[21]
This communications arc is an increasingly prominent component in China’s strategic approach to Africa, as it connects with emerging telecoms, data centres and by-product services of a connected continent.
Kenya and China’s relations have a long and fruitful history going back to 1963 and China being the fourth country to formally recognize Kenya following their independence. In 2017 China and Kenya entered into the Comprehensive Strategic Cooperative Partnership. This development has strengthened Sino-Kenyan relations considerably. Today, China is Kenya’s largest: trading partner; supplier of contract companies; and is Kenya’s largest lender.[22]
The Government of China funded large portions of the Kenyan Fiber Optic backbone, which was built by Huawei. The fiber optic backbone was implemented in two phases between 2009 and 2014.[23]
In March 2022 the Pakistan, East Africa, Connecting Europe (PEACE) undersea cable landed in Mombasa, Kenya. This USD 425 million project will see a significant increase in connectivity across East Africa with planned expansion to Southern Africa.[24] The project was funded in part by China as part of the Digital Silk Road Project.
In addition to the undersea cable network, Chinese tech giant Huawei, together with China Road Bridge Corporation pledged USD 577 million towards building a tier III data center and express-way as part of the Konza smart city, originally conceived by Huawei and Kenyan Ministry of Information and Communication Technology.[25]
In 2014 Kenya adopted their National Cybersecurity Policy followed by both the Computer Misuse and Cybercrimes Act of 2018 and the Data Protection Act of 2019. These two laws govern cybercrimes and personal data protection in Kenya.
The advent of the Internet has rendered the notion of absolute and exclusive sovereignty as obsolete; international collaboration has become a new core of the modern sovereignty principle. The ICT sector – as an interactive industry, requires an equally collaborative effort in governance and commerce. Further, in a largely untapped yet rapidly growing African market. Africa is fast becoming a priority region for investment by foreign companies looking to expand user bases or make use of large labour pools. China has taken notice and capitalised on existing partnership opportunities for robust ICT infrastructure and services. For more information and to work with us on this critical area, please contact Ethan Mudavanhu or Daniel Batty.
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