The Digital Networks Act and the EU Space Act

What the two EU proposals mean for satellite operators, and what to do now

The EU is rewriting the rules for its telecommunications and space infrastructure. Two draft laws matter most for satellite operators, and they do different jobs.

The Digital Networks Act (DNA)^[1]: proposed in January 2026, it replaces 27 national authorisations with one EU-level authorisation for networks, services and spectrum. No adoption date has yet been announced.

The EU Space Act^[2]: proposed in June 2025, it sets common EU rules for safety, resilience and sustainability in orbit. Adoption and application dates are not yet fixed; earlier projections pointed to adoption around 2028 and application around 2030, but slippage is likely given the open issues and ongoing negotiations.

Put simply, the DNA governs the signal and the service, the Space Act governs the spacecraft in orbit. Both move power from national governments to the European Commission.

Crucially, both texts are still drafts. The detail that will decide costs and obligations is being written now, in secondary legislation and Council negotiations.

They are also part of a bigger plan. The Commission frames the DNA, the Space Act and IRIS², its EUR 15.6 billion satellite constellation of 348 satellites, as one push for European “resilience and competitiveness.” Non-EU operators should read them as a sovereignty strategy: reduce EU dependence on non-European space infrastructure and protect European industry.

The Digital Networks Act: one EU door instead of 27

Today, a satellite operator must deal with up to 27 regulators, 27 sets of conditions and 27 fee schedules. Currently, operators must notify their networks and services separately with the national regulator in each EU member state they operate in. The DNA replaces that with EU-level authorisation. For most networks and services this takes the form of a “Single Passport” which would be a single notification with one regulator, covering the whole EU.

Satellite systems, however, are excluded from the Single Passport. Where other providers make a single ECS/ECN notification to one Member State’s regulator to cover the whole EU, satellite operators would have to notify the European Commission directly, under a specific procedure at Union level.^[3] The European Commission sets the conditions to that general authorisation for satellite networks and services and separately grants authorisation for the use of satellite spectrum.^[4]

The spectrum licensing is the most controversial. Most Member States already allow the use of satellite bands under a general authorisation, but France, Germany, Italy, Lithuania, Romania and Spain each require their own licence. Regulatory fees for the Ku band portion across those countries can run over EUR 500,000.

The trade-off is uneven. Services authorisation gets much lighter (one notification with the European Commission instead of 27 regulators), but spectrum authorisation becomes a strictly EU licensing regime with attached conditions. How strict those conditions turn out to be will decide whether operators gain or lose.

It should be noted that the 2 GHz spectrum issue is the test case (or exception) for the DNA’s single-authorisation model, and represents the power struggle the industry is watching most closely. The 2 GHz band is used for mobile satellite services (MSS) and is the only slice of satellite spectrum that already has an EU-level selection procedure, set up in 2008, rather than being licensed country by country. That makes it both the precedent the DNA’s model is built on and the first band to be authorised centrally, which is why how the Commission handles it, who qualifies, on what conditions, and at what price, is being read as the template for every satellite band that follows.

The new authorisation process for satellite operators at a glance

Security, lawful interception and data retention

Today, each Member State sets its own security and data conditions. Under the DNA, the Commission sets them centrally, as conditions of the authorisation.^[5] The draft requires an operator to:

• Be established in the EU;
• Ensure a high level of network security and resilience;
• Keep permanent control over every radio station and transmission using the spectrum, including ground stations, even when they are installed and operated outside the EU;
• Enable lawful interception and data retention in line with EU law.

This is a big shift for non-EU operators. The “permanent control” condition reaches assets and partners far beyond the EU, and obligations once negotiated country by country become uniform conditions of market access.

Fees are the big unknown. Spectrum fees will be set later by the Commission, by delegated act. Currently, spectrum fees vary country by country and as was mentioned above, many countries exempt certain frequencies from licensing and spectrum fees. How the DNA will approach this issue remains unclear, making the delegated act a critical point.

Existing national spectrum authorisations must be replaced with EU authorisations within 36 months of the DNA entering into force,^[6] a target, not a guarantee, since several Member States currently control spectrum assignment individually and may resist. Non-EU satellite operators must establish a presence in the Union to apply for frequency authorisation.

Once authorised, operators must meet the security conditions, comply with EU-level interception and data-retention duties, and file an annual report. For serious breaches, the Commission can suspend or withdraw the authorisation, or fine an operator up to 5% of worldwide turnover.^[7]

The EU Space Act: rules for operating in orbit

The Space Act covers the spacecraft itself, requiring debris mitigation and collision-avoidance measures, cybersecurity and safe end-of-life disposal. It does not regulate spectrum or satellite services, that is the DNA’s job. The Act does not apply to assets launched before 36 months after its entry into force (a moving date in the current text), or to assets used exclusively for defence or national security.^[8]

The route depends on home base: an EU operator applies to its own national authority for a certificate that every other Member State must recognise, while a non-EU operator goes through EU Space Act registration, decided by the Commission on the basis of a technical assessment by the European Union Agency for the Space Programme (EUSPA). That keeps foreign operators under central EU oversight, rather than letting them pick whichever Member State has the lightest regime.

A non-EU operator must register if it operates a spacecraft used to provide services or data into the EU. The crucial factor here is serving the EU market, not physical presence over EU territory.

The key question is whether you operate and control the satellite. A provider that operates and controls the satellite falls within the Act’s certification or registration regime, which in practice would capture most satellite operators. A provider that only resells satellite capacity falls into a lighter category with fewer obligations: the heavy duties — certification or registration, plus debris-mitigation, collision-avoidance, cybersecurity and end-of-life obligations — attach only to the operator that operates and controls the satellite. A pure reseller or distributor that buys capacity or data wholesale and sells it on, without operating or controlling a satellite, is not a space operator and so escapes those duties; its main constraint is that it may only distribute data or capacity sourced from a satellite that is itself registered and certificated.^[9]

For third-country operators, registration is decided by the Commission (on a technical assessment by the EUSPA), which must decide within twelve months of receiving a complete application.^[10]

If a third country’s regime is recognised as equivalent, its operators get a streamlined route;^[11] expect heavy lobbying from the US, UK, Canada, Japan, Norway and Australia to have their frameworks assessed as equivalent. “Equivalence” is a shortcut for foreign operators. The Commission can decide that another country’s rules on safety, debris and resilience are as strict as the EU’s. Where it does, operators from that country no longer must prove compliance to the EU from scratch, their home licence is accepted as proof, and they only make a light filing to get their satellite onto the EU register and receive the EU certificate. That saves them a second, duplicate approval. The equivalence criteria, and the list of countries that qualify, are likely to be among the most fought-over parts of the negotiation.

For serious breaches, the Commission can fine an operator up to twice the profit gained or loss avoided, or 2% of worldwide annual turnover.^[12]

How different operators can be affected under both Acts

Large operators, EU and non-EU alike (SpaceX, Amazon Leo, SES, Eutelsat, Viasat, Telesat), face both regimes in full, and a serious breach could draw penalties under both at once. Operators selling direct end-user connectivity carry the heaviest interception and data-retention burden; wholesale-only operators are less exposed.

Smaller and IoT operators get some relief: exemption from administrative charges under the DNA and simplified risk management under the Space Act, but no size threshold exempts any satellite operator from registration itself. The DNA waives administrative charges for undertakings below a certain turnover threshold or with very limited territorial scope.^[13] Under the Space Act, SMEs and research or education bodies qualify for a “light regime” that eases some of the safety, risk-management and environmental requirements.^[14] Either way, these are lighter obligations, not an exemption from requirements: whatever its size, every operator must still be certified or registered and listed on the EU’s central register of space activities (URSA), the public database under the Space Act will be used to track every authorised satellite.

Earth observation providers carry the heaviest Space Act load, but they would likely sit outside the DNA altogether, as they aren’t selling connectivity. Because the DNA governs electronic communications networks, services and spectrum, a provider whose only product is imagery or other space-based data would likely fall outside the DNA and is going to be regulated solely under the Space Act. The effect is an asymmetry: earth observation operators avoid the DNA’s authorisation and spectrum conditions but carry the full weight of the Space Act.

What operators should do now

As nothing is yet set in stone, a wait-and-see approach remains defensible; operators need not commit resources to compliance adaptations until key requirements solidify. Both texts are still moving, and the decisions that will set your costs are being made now.

Practical steps:

• Map your exposure across both frameworks. The answers differ sharply between a connectivity provider and an Earth observation provider.
• Engage early on the implementing and delegated acts. That is where fees and conditions will be decided.
• Prepare your EU legal presence now if you are a non-EU operator, as both acts require it.
• Plan for the transition windows. Most dates are projections subject to slippage, especially given ongoing negotiations and diplomatic pushback from third countries such as the US. Even so, the transition windows must be factored into long-term operational planning.

Where to endorse and where to push back

Endorse the harmonisation. One EU authorisation replacing 27 national regimes, cost-based and proportionate fees, one reporting requirement, and the simplifications to the Space Act.

Push back on the open flanks such as spectrum fees that could be tied to operators’ revenues, the broad “permanent control” condition, interception and data-retention duties left to future implementing acts, and Space Act rules broad enough to catch companies with little real EU involvement.

The bottom line

The DNA represents the broader commercial shift. It will either offer genuine relief from national market fragmentation or create a single, expensive EU bottleneck with the outcome determined by upcoming delegated acts. Meanwhile, opposition from various stakeholders leaves room for meaningful structural adjustments during negotiations.

The Space Act catches most satellite operators just for operating a spacecraft; those that also sell the satellite’s data, such as Earth observation firms, take on an extra duty — they can only sell data that comes from a registered, certified satellite and can be traced back to its source.

The right industry position should span both: support harmonisation, demand proportionality, and shape the secondary legislation while the drafting is still open.